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This paper examines Colombian electoral behaviour variables from the 2003 mayoral and 
council elections (specifically voter participation and the effective number of political parties) 
to try to identify how they have changed since previous periods (1988-2000). The changes are 
examined within the political context of the last elections and the 2003 political reform,1 the 
dynamics of the internal armed conflict, and the nationwide humanitarian crisis. We also 
qualitatively analyse the relationship between election results, the regional dynamics of the 
internal armed conflict, and the effects of the political reform, using first hand data from four 
municipalities: Barranquilla (Atlántico), Pasto (Nariño), Arauca (Arauca) and 
Barrancabermeja (Santander).2  The effect of the armed conflict on electoral guarantees is also 
examined as it directly affects the scope of the political reform.  
The paper is divided into four parts. The first deals with some of the conceptual difficulties 
for democracy in Colombia (the armed conflict and humanitarian crisis). The second analyses 
the 2003 local elections and examines general electoral tendencies following the changes 
introduced by the political reform. The third explores the results of the qualitative analysis; 
and finally we make our conclusions, which we hope will help future analyses of the current 
state of democracy in Colombia to go beyond just the electoral dimension. 
 
The limitations of electoral democracy in the context of a humanitarian crisis3 
Free and fair elections are necessary, but they are not enough. If we see elections as evidence 
that democracy exists, then we don’t appreciate the real value of democracy.  
(Mark Malloch, UNDP Administrator, 2002) 
Although this paper deals with electoral behaviour at a specific time (the 2003 municipal 
elections), it is necessary to touch on the general challenges democratic regimes face during 
times of crisis. Any analysis of electoral behaviour in Colombian municipalities requires an 
approximation of the impact that the internal armed conflict and humanitarian crisis have had 
on the minimum conditions for democracy. Restrictions on the right to vote, political 
                                                
1 The elections of 26 October 2003 were held using the new framework created by Legislative Act No. 01, 2003, 
the contents of which will be examined later. 
2 The qualitative information comes from Descentralización, gobierno local, y violencia. La economía política 
del municipio colombiano fieldwork carried out by the Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el 
Desplazamiento  (CODHES), and financed by the Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE). Approximately fifty people were interviewed from different social groups and 
sectors, including public functionaries and local government representatives.  
3 Humanitarian crises are: “Phenomena where different types of human suffering come together that are linked to 
economic, social, demographic, environmental, military or political factors. These crises tend to arise where 
there is poverty, a fragile State, where food is scarce and where there has been a natural disaster or armed 
conflict that has caused a food shortage, illness, forced displacements within and outside the country, and a large 
scale mobilisation of international aid resources.” (Escuela de Cultura de Paz, Universidad Autónoma de 
Barcelona, Alerta 2003. Informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz, Barcelona: Icaria 
Editorial, 2003, p.43). 
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competition, the right to opposition, freedom of expression and association, and access to 
pluralist information, are attacks on civil rights, the right to life, personal integrity and access 
to justice, amongst others. Furthermore, if someone is threatened and has to flee for his life, 
he cannot vote, or exercise his right to freedom of expression, without his rights being 
restricted. Being a citizen implies having one’s human rights protected in civil, social and 
political situations. So to understand the democratic nature of the Colombian regime, one 
must go further than its electoral definition. 
Minimalist analyses have stated that the following conditions are necessary, but not sufficient, 
for a political regime with democratic rules to exist: elected public authorities; clean, free 
elections; universal suffrage; the right to compete for political office; freedom of expression, 
association and access to information; respect for mandates that follow constitutionally 
established timeframes; a territory with a clearly defined demos votante; and a generalised 
belief that electoral processes and freedoms will be maintained indefinitely.4  
Critics, however, highlight the danger of evaluating a regime’s performance using only these 
factors, thus ignoring other fundamental aspects such as the State’s institutional capacity to 
protect life and personal integrity, administer justice and impose the rule of law throughout 
the country, and guarantee that people’s basic needs are met.5 In contrast to minimalist 
definitions, from a rights point of view a regime is democratic when it generates the 
conditions necessary for people to live with dignity and freely decide where to live and what 
to do, as well as having the right to vote for a wide range of political options: “democracy 
needs a State that ensures the universality of its political, social and civil rights”.6 
Obstacles to democracy in Colombia are not linked to how often elections are held, but they 
are equally serious. The ongoing internal armed conflict and the effect of institutionalised 
bipartisan politics on the rise of new political movements are two of the most relevant aspects. 
Pizarro, for example, has highlighted the political restrictions of the bipartisan, exclusive 
political monopoly, the state of permanent exception and excessively centralised decision 
making.7  
Recent statistical analyses have shown the negative effect of violence and the armed conflict 
on minimum democratic requirement indicators, such as participation and electoral 
competition. Hoyos and Ceballos’ study of local elections in Colombia between 1988 and 
2000 suggests that the armed conflict’s regional dynamics and socio-political violence are 
negatively affecting the right to vote and be elected free from restrictions and external 
pressures. The study shows that the armed control of local politics frequently leads to direct 
voter coercion, and that the intensification of the conflict impedes regular participation via 
formal channels.8 
                                                
4 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989; Robert Dahl, Poliarquía, 
participación y oposición, México: Rey, 1993 [1971]; Guillermo O’Donnell, Democratic Theory and 
Comparative Politics, Notre Dame, Indiana: The Hellen Kellog Institute for International Studies at University 
of Notre Dame, 1999.  
5 Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), La democracia en América Latina. Hacía una 
democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos, 2004, at http://www.pnud.org.  
6 PNUD (2004), p.28. 
7 Eduardo Pizarro, ‘Democracia Restringida y desinstitucionalización política’, in Pedro Medellín (ed.), La 
Reforma del Estado en América Latina, Bogotá: Fescol, 1989, p.308. 
8 Marcela Ceballos & Diana Hoyos, ‘Tendencias del comportamiento electoral y descentralización en los 
municipios de Colombia, 1988-2000’, Crisis States Working Papers, 57, London: Crisis States Research Centre, 
London School of Economics, 2004, p.29. 
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Following similar lines, García and Hoskin found a positive relationship between guerrilla 
actions and voter abstention. These results are associated with the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) political control mechanism, which is based on 
prohibiting voting in municipalities where it has a consolidated presence.9 
The slow progress of democracy in Colombia is related to all these aspects, the effects of 
which are reflected in electoral participation, competition and representation, and are 
indicators of the political regime’s legitimacy. A United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) study found that an electoral democracy index can be used to identify how much a 
state guarantees its citizens’ constitutional rights, but indicated that it is insufficient when 
evaluating the other dimensions of a democratic regime – specifically those related to 
governmental activities, and civil and social rights.10 The investigation found serious 
deficiencies in these areas in Latin American regimes. 
As regards civilians, for example, important legislative achievements were registered, but 
they were accompanied by a low State capacity to guarantee these rights in practice. No 
increase in human rights abuses was reported, although these are now not committed by the 
State, but by external forces that the State has been unable to control. Finally, the results 
indicate that civilians are the principal losers in Latin American democracies, where poverty 
and inequality have not fallen for a decade.11 
It can therefore be said that democracy in Colombia is flawed, not just because Colombia has 
not overcome the problems restricting full citizenship, but also due to the fact that the 
intensifying armed conflict has generated a humanitarian and human rights crisis that limits 
electoral guarantees. In many regions people cannot freely exercise their right to vote, and 
electoral competition is restricted. Although these limitations only affect 20 percent of the 
population directly, and only have concrete implications at a local-level,12 the indirect effects 
of the political crisis had national ramifications in the October 2003 elections, which in turn 
affect the scope of the political reform.  
  
The political context of the 2003 elections. 
By analysing the October 2003 mayoral, council, deputy and governor elections, we were able 
to identify the factors that directly influenced the results, and also explain, in part, changes in 
the local political map and political party composition. Three elements characterised the 
political context of the last local elections: 
1. A radicalised political climate since the 2002 presidential elections, in which “a 
radical proposal won; not because society had become polarised, but because it had 
moved towards one extreme of the political spectrum on the back of a set of 
                                                
9 Gary Hoskin & Miguel García, ‘Participación política y guerra en Colombia. Un análisis de las elecciones de 
2002’, in Gary Hoskin et al. (eds), Colombia 2002. Elecciones, comportamiento electoral y democracia, Bogotá: 
Universidad de los Andes, 2003pp.223-262. 
10 PNUD (2004). The UNDP electoral democracy index has three components: participation, competition and 
representation. These are measured by four sub-components: the right to vote, clean elections, fair elections and 
elected public officials. The civilian index is composed of equality and protection against discrimination; the 
right to life, physical integrity and security; the administration of justice; press freedom; and access to 
information. It also includes basic needs and social integration. 
11 PNUD (2004), p.24. 
12 According to Colombian Federation of Municipalities data on electoral competition restrictions, the right to 
vote, and the exercise of government in 200 of Colombia’s 1,300 municipalities. 
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heterogeneous hopes and expectations”.13 In other words, the country as a whole had 
moved to the political right. 
This radicalisation later spread to other elections. One was the 2003 referendum, which was 
designed to ratify president Uribe’s proposals. The referendum began as a consultation on 
political reform, but became a plebiscite on the presidency; and many of the proposals 
included in the referendum had, in fact, already been approved by congress.14 This initiative 
affected the local elections – the referendum was held the day before the mayoral, council and 
departmental governor elections – and imposed a new set of electoral dynamics. Supporting 
the referendum became the cornerstone of some campaigns, which played on the possibility 
of winning more votes in areas where the electorate had also supported the referendum. This, 
in turn, meant that the local elections focussed on central government proposals. 
Nevertheless, just six million people voted in the referendum – half the number who voted in 
the local elections. This was probably due to electoral saturation; numerous points were 
needed in the referendum to include all the essential political reforms. In the end there was 
minority support for the referendum and only a minimal number of the reforms were 
approved.15 The open opposition of some political parties and movements, as well as the 
central government’s intolerant reactions, generated a climate of political polarisation that 
was transferred to the regions.16 In summary, amidst uncertainty about the results of the 
referendum, the local electorate experienced the same climate of radicalisation that 
characterised the presidential elections.  
2. The second element that affected guarantees and influenced the election results was 
the closing of political spaces and the consequent restriction of citizens’ political 
rights. In regions and municipalities that were being disputed by guerrilla and 
paramilitary forces, or army and guerrilla forces, the closing of political spaces was 
the result of social control strategies applied by groups at the margin of the law, who 
use different forms of violence to achieve their ends. Threats and warnings directed at 
certain sectors of the population, or the inhabitants of certain regions, are a reflection 
of the polarised logic of war and a manifestation of the dispute for control, in which 
the right to neutrality in the midst of an armed conflict is ever more difficult to 
guarantee.17 
The most recent phase of the armed conflict has been characterised by an expansion into new 
municipalities, and an intensification in regions with a historic guerrilla or paramilitary 
presence following the incursion of a second group hoping to win a military advantage. 
Armed groups in these regions recur to offensives during which they attack their adversaries, 
or the civilian regulations related to controlling resources, people and territories. Thus, 
disputed areas register armed attacks and other actions, such as guerrilla and paramilitary-led 
                                                
13 Francisco Gutiérrez, ‘La radicalización del voto en Colombia’, in Hoskin et al. (2003), p.107. 
14 Marco Romero, ‘Elecciones, reforma política y garantías electorales’, Actualidad Colombiana, 2004, at 
http://www.actualidadcolombiana.org. 
15 According to the constitution, the minimum number of voters needed for a referendum to be validated is 25% 
of the total number of voters in the presidential elections. However, this figure was necessary for each of the 
referendum’s fifteen points. Just one of the points, in ten of Colombia’s 32 departments as well as the capital, 
was validated. 
16 The president called the result “unpatriotic”. See ‘Uribe perdió el referendo’, Diario El Clarín (Buenos Aires), 
30 October 2003. 
17 This is due to the logic of the war in Colombia: rural zones are occupied by guerrilla forces and urban areas by 
paramilitary forces and the army. The civilian population is considered to be the adversary’s social support base, 
and becomes a military objective. 
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blockades, and restrictions on free movement, the entry and exit of foodstuffs, medicine, 
information and humanitarian aid,18 in addition to armed strikes, illegal roadblocks, and the 
charging of protection money.19 
In essence, the way in which the armed groups intervene in social, political and economic 
activities has created adverse conditions for political participation. In a context of restricted 
fundamental human rights, individual rights are also restricted, which, in turn, has an effect on 
politics. In addition to the difficulties associated with voting in regions where the armed 
conflict is most intense, or where people’s rights are affected by different forms of 
confinement, voters and candidates received direct threats in 2003. 
Following Alvaro Uribe’s campaign, in which he ratified his intention to confront the 
guerrilla via an armed struggle, the FARC stated that mayors, councillors, governors and 
public functionaries in general were now military objectives – the idea being to destabilise 
democratic security and public order. In the 2003 elections this included the express order not 
to vote in areas where the FARC had a historic presence. During the pre-election period the 
group prevented candidates from campaigning in certain areas and candidates were also 
threatened and intimidated. 
The paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), on the other hand, were not 
openly opposed to the elections, although certain candidates were vetoed and threatened in 
areas where the group had a consolidated presence. In various regions there were reports of 
paramilitary groups pressuring voters to ensure that certain candidates or parties received 
support, or to prevent anyone being elected whose campaign was considered to be in 
opposition to the AUC’s political aims. 
Some indicators reveal the closure of political spaces, an absence of local electoral guarantees 
and a radicalisation of the vote. Areas with just one candidate and where candidates resigned 
are an indication of conditions under which electoral competition is impossible and where the 
minimum conditions for democracy are being threatened. The Colombian Federation of 
Municipalities reported 22 instances where there was just one candidate (see Table 1), and 9 
cases where there was no candidate – mostly in regions with a historic guerrilla presence.20 In 
regions where the government and the AUC were involved in peace negotiations, such as the 
Department of Córdoba, 22 rural polling stations had to be transferred to urban areas due to 
public order problems (Tierra Alta, Montelíbano, Buenavista and Puerto Libertador).  
Between 1998 and 2003, 64 mayors were assassinated, 181 candidates for governor, 
departmental assemblies, mayor and municipal council resigned,21 and campaigns were 
restricted in 200 municipalities (about 20 percent of the total). This represents political 
pressure on governmental institutions and voters, and had a negative effect on politics and 
influenced election results. Additionally, 160 mayors were forced to govern in exile in 2003 
following death threats, which limited the State’s ability to guarantee municipal governments. 
                                                
18 According to CODHES, 72 municipalities are affected by a total blockade. However almost all Colombian 
departments report some type of blockade. Regions such as Medio and Bajo Putumayo, the border between 
Caquetá and Putumayo, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Atrato and Bajo San Juan in Chocó are disputed zones.  
19 These include caps on the amount of foodstuffs or resources.  
20 Socotá, Boyacá – mayor and council; Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá – council; La Salina and Sácama, 
Casanare – council and mayor; Santa Rosa, Cauca – mayor and council; Algeciras, Huila – council; Calamar and 
Miraflores, Guaviare – council; Carurú, Vaupés – mayor. 
21 Not including the 22 candidates who resigned in Acarí, Norte de Santander, but whose resignation was not 
officially accepted. 
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Many departments where just one candidate ran for election have a consolidated paramilitary 
presence (Antioquia, Córdoba, Sucre, Meta, Guajira and parts of Cundinamarca), and others 
are in the midst of a dispute between paramilitaries and guerrillas (Chocó and Norte de 
Santander). In these regions, the group has tried to co-opt institutional representation and 
participation mechanisms to control local politics.  
Table 1: Municipalities with single candidates in 2003 local elections 
 
Department Municipality Electoral Participation Party 
Cocorna 30.8% Equipo Colombia Antioquia Tarso 49.6% Partido Liberal Colombiano 
Arauca Fortul 17.3% Partido Liberal Colombiano 
Almeida 65.6% Polo Democrático Independiente
Guacamayas 66.7% Movimiento Nacional 
Maripi 53.5% Partido Colombia Siempre Boyaca 
Paipa 65.4% Paritido Liberal Colombiano 
Jambalo 60.9% Alianza Social Indigena Cauca San Sebastián 36.4% Alianza Social Indigena 
Certegui 70.1% Partido Liberal Colombiano Choco Sipi 61.5% Partido Liberal Colombiano 
San Andrés de Sotavento 69.5% Partido Liberal Colombiano Córdoba Valencia 61.1% Movimiento Colombia Viva 
Quebradanegra 62.8% Movimiento Unionista 
San Bernardo 51.1% Partido Conservador Cundimarca 
Yacopi 63.1% Partido Nuevo Liberalismo 
Guajira Manaure 39.5% Partido Conservador 
Meta Mapiripa 22.8% Partido Cambio Radical 
Chitaga 62.2% Partido Liberal Colombiano Norte de Santander Labateca 54.9% Movimiento Apertura Liberal 
Santander Ocamonte 76.2% Partido Liberal Colombiano 
Sucre San Onofre 48.2% Partido Conservador 
Source: National Registrar 
 
In regions with a guerrilla presence, mayors and public functionaries were selectively 
threatened and assassinated, and in Caquetá and Arauca there were large-scale resignations of 
all local representatives.22 In consequence, these regions are experiencing political difficulties 
related to civil rights and electoral participation.  
In addition to these dynamics of the armed conflict, some of president Uribe’s democratic 
security strategies have also limited political representation in as much as they do not 
recognise the right to neutrality (especially strategies that encourage the civilian population to 
provide information about members of illegal groups, such as the informant network, the 
cooperation network, and other initiatives that involve direct contact with the internal conflict, 
such as the ‘soldados campesinos’ programme). Finally, the round-ups that are part of the 
                                                
22 In 2002, all the municipal councillors in Puerto Rondón and Cravo Norte (Arauca) resigned following threats 
and public order problems. In 2003, all Arauca’s mayors did the same. The government did not accept their 
resignations and militarised the department, without strengthening the State’s civilian presence. The government 
even appointed a military mayor in Arauquita (Colonel (r) Hugo Manuel Benítez), a town where the guerrilla 
have been active for more than 20 years, and where death threats forced him to resign. In 2003, all Caqueta’s 
mayors were threatened and, according to the Colombian Federation of Municipalities, none have been able to 
return from internal exile, where they governed between 2001-2004. 
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fight against terrorism do not recognise due process and affect social leaders’, candidates’ and 
representatives’ personal security: they have to go back home and deal with the stigma of 
having been suspected, even if all charges against them have been dropped. 
The arbitrary detention of social leaders, union members and political candidates in some 
municipalities during the 2003 elections led to a worsened climate of radicalisation. In 
October 2003, in Arauca, for example, some of the principal candidates were detained just 
five days before the elections (Julián Reyes, liberalismo; Benjamín Sacadagui, ex-
departmental assembly deputy and candidate; and the current mayor of Saravena who was in 
the middle of campaigning). They were later freed after proving their innocence.23  
The closure of political spaces due to the climate of radicalisation and other dynamics of the 
internal armed conflict restricted local political participation and affected 20 percent of all 
Colombian municipalities in the October 2003 elections.24 Elections have become a stage 
from which the irregular armed groups consolidate their political control. According to Marco 
Romero: 
If the crisis affects the regional authorities like this, it is even worse for the 
general population whose democratic rights have been limited by violence. In 
general, humanitarian crisis indicators are correlated with electoral and political 
guarantees. People being displaced by violence and social leaders being 
threatened, displaced or assassinated constitute structural faults in the State’s 
responsibility to defend civil rights and, in this case, political rights as well.25 
 
3. The political reform approved by congress in Legislative Act 01, 2003, is the third 
factor that led to important changes in the political system. The modified electoral 
system and the ‘law of parties’ had been under debate in congress since 1998, but no 
agreement was reached by the non-traditional parties leading the debate. Finally, in 
2003 a much wider set of reforms was approved.  
The most important electoral reform was the new threshold for being elected to a public 
corporation. The political reform included new lists with an optional preferential vote, the 
formation of parliamentary benches organised by party or movement and the prohibition of 
double or multiple candidatures in public corporations. The reform established a threshold of 
2 percent of total votes for the senate (close to 240,000 votes at 2000 levels),26 and 50 percent 
of the current quotient system for the other public corporations.27 These requirements were 
                                                
23 CODHES interview, President of the Commission for Human Rights, Arauca, 21 & 26 August 2004. The 
number of arrests within the framework of the government’s flagship democratic security policy are alarming: 
“The Minister of Defence reported that during the first year of the democratic security policy 125,778 people 
were arrested (334 per day)” (Corporación Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo- Fundación Comité de 
Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos, ‘¿Cacería de brujas? Detenciones masivas y seguridad democrática’, in 
Reelección el embrujo continúa. Segundo año de gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Bogotá: Plataforma 
Colombiana - Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo, 2004, pp.199-206). However, by November 2003, 
just 43% of those detained had been charged and the majority had been freed. Testimonies collected during 
fieldwork mention cases of people having been detained and freed up to six times in four months – a clear 
indication of irregularities in the way the security forces are applying the strategy.  
24 Elections were not held in approximately eleven municipalities where, due to violence, there were no 
candidates. 
25 Romero (2004), p.23. 
26 This element will come into force in the 2006 parliamentary elections. 
27 The electoral quotient is the result of dividing the total number of valid votes for each public corporation by 
the total number of seats. This figure is still used to calculate the threshold, but not for assigning seats. This 
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designed to reduce the importance of small numbers of votes and eliminate electoral micro-
businesses.  
The reform included using the D’Hondt method to assign seats. In the past almost all seats in 
the corporations were won by residuals or fractions of the quotient. The new threshold means 
that lists that do not win at least one quotient will almost never win seats. The mechanism was 
designed to award seats to lists winning high numbers of votes, and to ensure that relatively 
new political movements, with significant support at mayoral level, could also win an equally 
significant proportion of seats. 
The optional preferential vote allows parties to publish open or closed lists. The former 
require voters to choose the candidate who should be at the head of the list. Although this may 
encourage personality-based campaigns, when combined with the proportional figure, the 
preferential vote ensures some degree of institutionalisation and structure in the way political 
movements choose their candidates.  
Critics of the reform highlight the fact that the 2 percent threshold for the senate favours 
national-level political parties with support in the big cities, whilst restricting new, local-level 
parties in smaller municipalities. Others point to the preferential vote’s perverse effect of 
becoming an incentive for personality-based electoral micro-businesses, and of taking 
importance away from other means of institutionalising parties via formal procedures. 
However, the preferential vote benefits the parties more than the candidates: the threshold and 
number of seats are linked to the total number of votes the list wins. In Bogotá, for example, 
the city council has 45 seats and the threshold is 19,300 votes. In the 2003 elections, María 
Margarita Zuleta won 17,253 votes, but her party (Nuevo Partido) did not reach the threshold 
and won no seats. Luis Eduardo Díaz’s party, however, won a total of 49,597 votes and, 
thanks to the preferential vote, he won a seat on the city council with just 1,343 votes.28 
The proportional figure, the threshold and the preferential vote were meant to stimulate 
political alliances and eliminate electoral micro-businesses. Furthermore, these mechanisms 
increased the probability that political movements would be more equally represented in the 
public corporations. As the number of movements falls, seats are distributed between fewer, 
larger parties. In essence, the reform encourages advances towards the democratisation and 
institutionalisation of political parties and guarantees more orderly political competition. 
However, some elements of the reform put local political movements at a disadvantage (due 
to the threshold for reaching the senate). 
Critics of the reform have stated that the new formulae will encourage political alliances but 
not the institutionalisation of the system, thereby negatively affecting pluralism. The reform, 
however, does not refer to alliances, but to a total number of votes won by a “determined 
number of senators or representatives” that, if the threshold is reached, mean that “the new 
group can enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed benefits for parties and movements”. This 
refers to financing for campaigns, which has been increased by 300 percent for 2006. This is a 
comparative advantage for the old political class that currently hold seats in the senate and 
house of representatives, clearly evidenced by the number of lists standing for municipal 
councils that did not reach the threshold. 
                                                                                                                                                     
decision is more historical than theoretical – it was taken following a majority vote by members of the public 
corporations (Romero, 2004, p.3). 
28 Angélica Bernal, Elecciones de 2003: El Referendo y Autoridades Locales, Bogotá: Red Mujer y Participación 
Política, 2004, at http://www.fescol.org.co/política-formas-genero-ompp-b-5.htm. 
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Electoral variables, 2003 
Electoral participation and the effective number of parties (ENP) were examined using the 
three factors described above. The effects of the political reform can be seen in the size and 
composition of the party system (measured using ENP) that should, in the medium-term, be 
restructured to favour larger political movements.  
Although the reform was not designed to increase electoral participation, this variable is 
linked to changes in the party system, and has a tight relationship with the electoral ground 
rules in terms of the incentives or disincentives that make voters go to the polls or not. 
Electoral participation is an indicator of how the modifications introduced by the reform were 
perceived by the electorate. If voters are sceptical about the effect their votes will have on 
local politics, their perception may change following the reform’s implementation (especially 
in terms of the reconfigured party system and its effect on the political classes). It is also 
important to mention that the reform’s impact will be more clear in the 2006 Senate and 
House of Representatives elections – especially if new parties are restricted by the threshold. 
Participation in mayoral and council elections did not vary significantly during the 1990s (see 
Figure 1).29 In a large part of the country less than half of the eligible voters went to the polls. 
In 13 percent of all municipalities in 2003, participation was less than 50 percent. The same 
was true in 11 percent of all municipalities in 2000, and in the 1990s the figure was more than 
25 percent – in more than a quarter of Colombia less than half those eligible to vote actually 
participated.  
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Figure 1: Average national participation in mayoral elections, 1988-2003 
Source: National Registrar, author’s calculations 
 
The slight increase in participation in 2000, when almost 60 percent voted, is still within 
historical parameters. A long-term examination is needed of the effect of single candidates 
and lists in concentrating voting, and whether these represent an incentive to voters. It is 
probable that sceptical voters will go to the polls if these regulations stimulate programme-
based campaigning. 
                                                
29 Electoral participation is calculated here by dividing the number of people eligible to vote by the number of 
valid votes cast. 
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In spite of the slight improvement in 2000, it is important to remember that in many rural 
zones that suffered guerrilla pressure, councillors were elected with 8 votes (Cartagena del 
Chairá, Caquetá). Although the total number of voters in 2003 did not fall,30 any inability to 
vote due to external pressure is, per se, an indicator of vulnerable political rights. 
Lastly, we looked for variations in the effective number of political parties in municipal 
councils, and the number of non-Conservative and Liberal mayors compared with previous 
years.31 In other words, whether the unique lists, the preferential vote, the threshold and the 
participation figure produced changes in political party representation in the public 
corporations – a smaller number of parties is expected, in terms of seats being distributed in 
accordance with the participation figure rather than residuals, that make it harder to win seats. 
We also examined whether unique candidates by party had an al reducri impact on the 
number of mayoral candidates and lists for municipal councils, thus evaluating whether the 
expected political alliance effect was produced.  
Figure 2 shows that the average ENP before 2000 was typical of a bipartisan system, and that 
one party was dominant in most electoral periods between 1988 and 1997. This variable’s 
rising tendency since 1994 reached its peak in 2003, when the national average reflected a 
multi-party system with more than three parties for the first time in a decade; although in 
1992 the variable had also shown a tendency very close to a multi-party system.32 This change 
is very important in terms of opening up the Colombian political system. Until now the two 
traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative) have had a monopoly on representation that has 
generated a negative effect on political renovation in municipal councils.  
Interestingly, in spite of the 2003 political reform, there was an increase in the effective 
number of parties. This indicates that the new method for assigning seats and the new 
electoral competition rules led to diversification within councils and favoured more political 
parties than in previous years. This can be explained by various factors: generalised 
disenchantment with the old political classes, who had extended their influence to small 
municipalities, actually favoured independent candidates and relatively new parties. This was 
evidenced by voter opinion polls during the 2004 presidential election campaign, as well as 
the interviews carried out for this study, in which the emergence of new political forces was 
registered alongside a number of moves from the Liberal Party towards independent 
candidates who were part of what was then a strong independent current: Uribism. This was 
how, in the midst of voter radicalisation, new parties such as Movimiento Equipo Colombia, 
Cambio Radical and Convergencia Ciudadana appeared, and became the principal non-
                                                
30 This is explained by the fact that the rural population (under guerrilla pressure) is lower than the urban 
population. If information was available on the number of rural areas where it was impossible to vote, the 
geographical impact would probably be greater. 
31 According to Laakso and Taagepera: “In a bipartisan system with two equally strong parties, the effective 
number of parties is exactly 2.00. If one party is considerable stronger than the other, with a percentage of votes 
or seats equivalent to, for example, 70% / 30%, the effective number of parties is 1.72, a figure that corresponds 
with our intuition that we are moving from a bipartisan to a one-party system. If there are three equally strong 
parties then the effective number is 3.00. If one of the parties is weaker than the other two then the effective 
number of parties is between 2.00 and 3.00, depending on the third party’s relative force” (Arendt Lijphart, 
Sistemas electorales y sistemas de Partidos. Un estudio de veintisiete democracias 1945-1990, Madrid: Centro 
de Estudios Constitucionales, 1994, pp.114-118). The formula is: 
 
 
 1 
Σ  e i 
2           NEP 
 
where e is the proportion of seats of party i. 
32 This can be explained by the impact of the party system reforms, contained in the 1991 constitution, that 
promoted electoral competition and facilitated the formation of political groups.  
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traditional forces in terms of mayors and seats on municipal councils. The political spectrum 
was, therefore, widened in terms of new parties (related to Uribism) rather than an 
aggregation of forces.  
Left-wing movements became stronger in the principal cities but gained little ground in other 
municipalities, especially the smallest. This was the case of the Polo Democrático 
Independiente (PDI), the M-19, the Movimiento Ciudadano and the Movimiento Verde 
Oxígeno – the most significant left-wing parties that triumphed in Cali, Bogotá and 
Barranquilla, but which lagged behind at national-level.  
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Figure 2: National average of Effective Number of Parties in municipal councils, 1988-2003 
Source: National Registrar, author’s calculations 
  
When the number of municipalities with more than 2.5 effective parties is examined (see 
Table 2), it is clear that since 1994 the bipartisan to multi-partisan tendency has extended to 
ever more municipalities. In 1994, 15 percent of all municipalities reported more than 2.5 
parties, in 1997 the figure was 16 percent, in 2000 it was a third, and in 2003 it was over 66 
percent. In summary, the opening up of the political spectrum continues and, in spite of the 
violence that affected 20 percent of the Colombian electorate in 2003, it took a qualitative 
leap that was an indirect effect of the radicalised climate described above.  
Table 2: Municipal Distribution (%) by Interval in the Effective Number of Parties 
 
Interval 1988 1992 1994 1997 2000 2003 
1 – 1.48 28.10% 13.49% 27.82% 29.02% 20.61% 2.22%
1.48 – 1.97 30.50% 18.48% 29.85% 26.16% 21.63% 9.33%
1.97 – 2.46 26.34% 20.52% 23.57% 22.18% 23.84% 18.76%
> 2.46 8.32% 41.31% 15.06% 16.08% 31.61% 66.82%
Source: National Registrar, author’s calculations 
 
This table shows that the high number of multi-partisan municipalities in 1992 was atypical. 
In following years this number fell and only became generalised once again in 2003. The 
anomaly can be explained by the immediate effect of the 1991 constitutional reforms, which 
facilitated political party formation and stimulated electoral competition. 
If we look at the proportion of mayoral elections won by the traditional parties (Liberal and 
Conservative) compared with those won by non-traditional political movements, a similar 
tendency is observed to the opening up of the formal political system at the local level (see 
Figure 3). Since 1994, ever more municipalities have elected non-traditional parties. At the 
start of the 1990s, traditional parties were dominant in 80 percent of Colombian 
municipalities, but in 2003, they controlled less than half. Over the same period more than a 
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third of mayors were from non-traditional parties, and in various municipalities indigenous 
parties have shown a strong capacity to strengthen themselves as political alternatives.33 2003 
was, therefore, an important year for the opening up of the political system, probably 
associated with the rise of new parties that supported Uribism at the local level (e.g. Cambio 
Radical) and that achieved an important level of support following the 2002 presidential 
elections. 
 
Figure 3: Mayoral Elections won by Party, 1988-2003 (%) 
Source: National Registrar, author’s calculations 
  
Opposition parties’ victories in mayoral elections in the principal cities reflected a 
strengthened opinion vote (the PDI in Bogotá). In many Colombian cities, non-traditional 
movements won mayoral and governor elections. In Valle del Cauca, Angelino Garzón 
(Partido Convergencia Popular Cívica) beat the Liberal candidate; in Medellín, Sergio 
Fajardo (Alianza Social Indígena) beat the Liberal and Conservative Parties for the first time 
since 1988; in Cali, the ex-councillor Apolinar Salcedo (Movimiento Sí Colombia) became 
mayor; in Bucaramanga, Honorio Galvis (ANAPO) won; and Pereira was won by Juan 
Manuel Arango (Nuevo Partido). Indigenous movements have important levels of 
participation in departments such as Nariño and Cauca, where social mobilisation and 
political participation have been led by this sector of society.  
These tendencies show that multi-party politics are not exclusive to the principal cities as 
other studies have stated,34 but that it has extended to more than half of all Colombian 
municipalities. It is also worth mentioning that the system of seat assignation explains a large 
part of the ‘effective number of parties’ variable. 
                                                
33 This distinction between the Liberal and Conservative Parties and non-traditional parties was made by looking 
not just at the parties’ names, but also by verifying which parties were just a faction of the Liberal or 
Conservative Party.  
34 Ceballos & Hoyos (2004). Lariza Pizzano speaks of “conurbated” municipalities and cities when referring to 
the spatial element’s importance in explaining electoral behaviour, especially in rural areas that are influenced by 
large urban centres (‘Ciudad, territorio y elecciones: Un aporte conceptual al análisis de los resultados 
electorales en las áreas metropolitanas de Colombia’, in Hoskin et al. (2003), pp.193-222). 
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However, it is important to note that the fragmentation of liberalism and conservatism has led 
to the rise of multiple political factions that have become small electoral micro-businesses 
representing the old political classes. In this context it is difficult to identify when an 
increased number of parties reflects a broader political spectrum (i.e. if the ‘other’ 
classification includes alternative political forces, or if it reflects the factionalism typical of 
Colombian parties, who frequently use this strategy to win more votes). In other words, an 
increase in the effective number of parties in municipal councils and a higher proportion of 
non-traditional mayors do not necessarily mean that new political forces are consolidating 
themselves at the local level.  
As regards electoral competition, the figures show that the political reforms did not 
significantly reduce the number of lists for councils, although they did slightly reduce the 
number of mayoral candidates in 2003, compared with 2000. This means that the strategy 
designed to stimulate political alliances did not work, at least at the local level. In 2003, there 
were 3,256 candidates for mayor versus 3,379 in 2000, whilst the number of lists presented 
for municipal councils in 2003 was significantly higher than in 2000 (56,459 and 30,060 
respectively). This means that the political alliance formula could have a greater impact on the 
2006 Senate and House of Representatives elections.  
Lastly, the election results showed that the preferential vote scheme tends to weaken 
personality-based candidatures, and benefits lists of candidates with significant electoral 
support. The vast majority of parties (more than 90 percent) opted to use open lists for 
municipal councils, thus adopting the preferential vote as a means of structuring their 
candidates. This is related to the level of deinstitutionalisation in the Colombian political 
party system and the need to promote processes that allow political strategies to be decided on 
within the movements themselves.  
  
Case Studies 
Interviews with local government officials and diverse social sectors in four municipalities 
allow us to contrast statistical information with first hand data experiences of the relationship 
between local democracy, political reform and the internal armed conflict. In general, a 
minimum of eight interviews were conducted in each municipality, and documents were 
consulted that contained data on the aspects mentioned. More than being about the elections, 
the interviews were designed to explore the following factors: a) the impact of violence on the 
October 2003 mayoral and council elections; b) local governability, or the capacity of 
municipal governments to respond to their citizens’ demands; c) the perceived legitimacy of 
the elections (were they clean, fair, free and competitive?); d) State democracy or the capacity 
of institutions to ensure respect and compliance with norms in their jurisdictions; e) 
characteristics of, and changes to, the formal political system (the party system, and local 
participation and representation). There follows an examination of the aspects related to the 
elections and changes in the formal political system. 
This section is an extract of a wider qualitative analysis in terms of themes and number of 
municipalities. Four municipalities were chosen to include different geographical zones, the 
dynamics of the armed conflict and the principal electoral behaviour tendencies registered in 
the decade.  
The municipalities used were: 
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• Pasto (Nariño) – one of the principal Colombian cities. Pasto has a tradition of strong 
social organisation and motivation, mostly due to the importance of indigenous groups 
in the region’s politics. In 2005, there was a dispute in Nariño between the FARC and 
ELN and the army, which has led to an intensification of the armed conflict. Pasto, 
however, is an example of political renovation: the M-19 triumphed in the mayoral 
elections.  
• Barranquilla (Atlántico) – one of the principal Colombian cities. Barranquilla has been 
undergoing political renovation in municipal administration since 1992, when the 
Movimiento Ciudadano won the mayoral elections and ended the Liberal Party’s 
dominance. There is a relatively strong paramilitary presence in the city, although the 
zone is generally peaceful and there is no open armed conflict. 
• Barrancabermeja (Santander) – an intermediate city and the country’s principal oil 
producer. There is a guerrilla presence in rural areas, but paramilitary forces control 
the urban areas. In spite of this, a left-wing PDI candidate was elected mayor in 2003.  
• Arauca (Arauca). The municipality has a consolidated ELN presence, but there have 
been violent incursions by paramilitary groups since 1997, and the FARC since 2000. 
It is the centre of the government’s democratic security policy and has become a ‘war 
laboratory’ where all the different security strategies are being used: the informer and 
collaborator network, continuous massive detentions, military rule with restrictions on 
free movement and absolute control of radio communications, a concentration of 
North American advisers (part of the Plan Colombia package), aerial spraying of illicit 
crops,35 and the recent use of the counter insurgency strategy known as ‘Operación 
Escudo’ (Operation Shield). 
 
Table 3: Electoral Participation – Mayors 
Source: National Registrar, author’s calculations 
 
Municipality 1988 1990 1992 1994 1997 2000 2003 
Barranquilla 0.65 0.56 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.42
Pasto 0.64 0.54 0.42 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.50
Arauca 0.82 0.60 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.53 0.49
Barrancabermeja 0.54 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.62 0.54
  
Table 4: Effective Number of Parties (1988-2003) 
Source: National Registrar, author’s calculations 
 
Municipality 1988 1992 1994 1997 2000 2003 
Barranquilla 1.54 5.23 2.71 2.26 3.97 4.64
Pasto 2.47 4.35 2.67 6.12 4.95 8.02
Arauca 1.61 3.07 1.34 1.32 1.14 4.25
Barrancabermeja 2.31 6.15 2.17 2.51 2.56 5.45
 
Table 3 shows a fall in electoral participation in all municipalities compared with 2000, 
although the levels are generally the same as they were in the 1990s. Table 4 shows that all 
municipalities reported increases in the effective number of parties, the most significant being 
in Barrancabermeja (from a bipartisan system in 2000 to more than five parties in 2003), 
                                                
35 Better known as ‘Plan Patriota’, this is a military campaign that receives US support and financing. The initial 
phase included deploying 17,000 operatives in hot-spots.  
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Pasto (from five to eight parties on the municipal council), and Arauca (from one party in 
2000 to more than four in the last elections).  
These increases indicate that in spite of the dynamics of the armed conflict, violence has no 
effect on the number of political movements standing for local election. The political reform, 
therefore, has not had the desired effect on the number of parties. However, the qualitative 
information also shows that in some municipalities interference in local politics by irregular 
groups does lead to increased pressure on voters, candidates and governors. 
Table 5 contains specific information on candidates and lists in 2003. Contrary to national 
tendencies, the number of mayoral candidates in these municipalities increased compared to 
the previous period, but the number of lists for councils fell to roughly half the number in 
2000 (nationwide the figures were 56,459 in 2003, 26,000 more than in 2000). A reduced 
number of lists standing for council elections is an indicator of the political alliances the 
reform hoped for, which were designed to ensure an increased probability of reaching the 
threshold. However, the results show that just half the lists actually achieved the threshold in 
2003, and the others, therefore, found it difficult to aspire to national-level representation 
(Congress). 
Table 5: Number of mayoral candidates and council lists. Lists that achieved the threshold and 
lists with preferential vote 
Source: National Registrar, author’s calculations 
 
 Mayoral candidates Council lists Lists not reaching threshold 
Municipality 2000 2003 2000 2003 No. % del total 
With 
preferential 
vote 
Barranquilla 6 15 121 27 16 59.26% 22 
Arauca 5 7 81 12 5 41.67% 11 
Pasto 8 7 84 22 12 54.55% 15 
Barrancabermeja 8 17 18 24 13 54.17% 21 
TOTAL 27 46 304 85 46 54% 69 
 
 
As regards the preferential vote, 80 percent of all parties in the four municipalities presented 
open lists that allowed voters to select the candidate who should lead the proposal. This 
indicates that the parties still do not have structured candidatures for the public corporations, 
and through chance or popularity some public figures still have a wide margin in the lists’ 
definition.  
The election results indicate that although there was a reduction of 50 percent in the number 
municipal council lists in 2003, this was not due to political alliances. In addition, the 
effective number of parties (the distribution of seats in 2003) increased compared with 2000; 
in these four municipalities, and nationwide, the party system grew by at least one political 
force. 
An examination of the qualitative information regarding the impact of violence on the 2003 
elections, and their legitimacy, shows that electoral guarantees were affected in municipalities 
where political spaces had been closed by the radicalised climate. In Arauca and 
Barrancabermeja, the results reflect the difficulty for rural populations of travelling to urban 
polling stations. Furthermore, candidates denounced having been pressured by one of the 
armed groups active in the region. 
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In Arauca, the guerrilla used intimidation to prevent the rural population from voting, thus 
putting political pressure on the national government and challenging the democratic security 
strategies in the department. Other factors also influenced the reduced levels of participation: 
Abstention triumphed; the electoral census was 100,000, but less than 40,000 
people voted for the following reasons: a lack of credibility amongst the 
candidates, threats from armed actors and the arrest of the most popular 
candidates for mayor and governor on October 21.36 
In addition, the armed forces’ influence on local politics in this municipality has led to 
security measures being implemented with minimal civilian control. In 2002, the region was 
declared a special war area (rehabilitation zone), which led, according to some social leaders, 
to “civilian life [becoming] militarised”. In this context political polarisation is a reality, and 
the right to free association, meetings, expression and opposition is restricted by the armed 
groups’ multiple pressures on civil society. When responding to the question “Who’s in 
charge here?” one of the most common responses was: “Fear and intimidation”.37 
The targeting of specific sectors of society, specifically unions, human rights defenders and 
political leaders, is a constant indicator of Arauca’s limited political spectrum: 
Relations with the church are good, but with the army they are extremely delicate. 
There is no possibility of dialogue because [the army] accuse us of being guerrilla 
collaborators, or fighters. And the police have adopted a stance of silence.38 
These dynamics are even affecting traditional party leaders: 
In the past one couldn’t execute political control or announce one’s candidature 
without obtaining the permission of the armed groups with a historic presence in 
the department. But we’re still at risk because now members of the Liberal Party 
in the department are called guerrillas and members of Cambio Radical are 
accused of being paramilitaries. But if we don’t seek the guerrilla’s permission 
they threaten us, and the State stigmatises us… Two deputies were arrested after 
being accused of being guerrillas by an informant. The mayor of Saravena took 
office whilst under arrest and our own candidate was also accused.39 
  
In Barrancabermeja, the dynamics of the armed conflict have had a similar effect, although 
characterised by less visible control mechanisms. There is a relatively high level of 
paramilitary infiltration in municipal institutions, and the AUC veto campaigns and 
candidates opposed to paramilitarism in the city. The Communist Party candidate, for 
example, says: 
I was not elected mayor because the [paramilitaries] prohibited people from 
voting for me. I could not go into Barrancabermeja’s [poor neighbourhoods] 
because I was being threatened. They took down my posters and put up Edgar 
                                                
36 CODHES interview with Martín Sandoval, Representative to the Permanent Human Rights Assembly in 
Arauca, 25 August 2004. 
37 CODHES interview with Martín Sandoval, Representative to the Permanent Human Rights Assembly in 
Arauca, 25 August 2004. 
38 CODHES interview with Oscar García, President of the Unión Sindical Obrera (USO) in Arauca, 25 August 
2004. 
39 CODHES interview with Germán Naber Cruz, President of the Arauca municipal council, 25 August 2004. 
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Cote’s, their own candidate. He’s the mayor now. 15 percent of the count in the 
mayoral elections took 19 days to complete, on the last day they changed the 
votes and took out the ones for the Communist Party. This is part of State policy. 
We lost 30 votes.40 
Some people mention the pressure put on voters: 
There was pressure from paramilitary groups during the last elections. In northeast 
Barrancabermeja some women said that they voted for x candidate because they 
were being pressured. They censused each household and then told them to vote 
for a specific candidate. They watched them. People were scared. They made the 
juries count the vote four times when Uribe’s proposals weren’t approved in the 
referendum.41 
Electoral participation is explained by multiple factors, not just violence: 
There’s a sustained 45 percent abstention rate because the lists are fragmented, 
there are no truly cohesive, articulated parties. When the guerrilla were here, 
human rights abuses shot up during the elections. In these elections there weren’t 
as many problems and actions as we’d expected. Scepticism, there are constraints, 
impositions, coactions, public and private protests that show how candidatures 
were influenced. Low level of opinion votes. 
In this municipality the general perception is that there has been a high level of paramilitary 
infiltration in local government, private businesses and municipal political life via the creation 
of movements and presentation of AUC candidates in elections. This has limited local 
electoral legitimacy and has led to a relatively high level of abstention: 
There are no guarantees for civil and political rights here. The United Self 
Defence Forces of Colombia are entering civilian, political and economic life in 
the municipality. They control pawnshops, betting, the lottery… There’s no 
pressure from the illegal forces because they have their own councillors on the 
inside.42 
The last administration had links with the paramilitaries. A communicator was 
assassinated and there were massacres. Three of the mayor’s secretaries have been 
in the hands of the paramilitaries.43 
  
The dynamics of the irregular groups’ institutional penetration are linked to their 
appropriation of lucrative business income in the municipality, financial support given to 
campaigns and political activities, and permanent relationships with public sector employees, 
amongst others. In Barrancabermeja some functionaries expressed that: 
There is pressure here. Call the paramilitary commandant and tell him what needs 
doing and where… Fear means that there is no community participation here, and 
anyone who makes a complaint is killed.44  
                                                
40 CODHES interview with David Ravelo in Barrancabermeja, May 2004. Member of the Communist Party 
leadership and Unión Patriótica councillor in 2001. Mayoral candidate for the Communist Party in 2003. 
41 CODHES interview with USO leaders in Barrancabermeja, May 2004.  
42 CODHES interview with Jorge Ferreira, Liberal Party councillor, Barrancabermeja, May 2004. 
43 CODHES interview with the CREDHOS director, Barrancabermeja, May 2004. 
44 CODHES interview with Jorge Ferreira, Liberal Party councillor, Barrancabermeja, May, 2004. 
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The closure of political spaces in Arauca, and paramilitary penetration of different local 
spheres in Barrancabermeja are associated with the electoral reform’s real impact on the 
widened party system. In spite of the significant increase in the effective number of parties in 
these municipalities (in Arauca the number rose from 1.14 in 2000 to 4.25 in 2003, and in 
Barrancabermeja from 2.56 to 5.45), new political movements’ access to elected posts is seen 
as a ‘fictitious’ political renovation. The mayor of Barrancabermeja said: “I am not part of the 
Polo, they gave me their support, but they’ve never seen my face”.45 At the time of the 
interview the mayor was being investigated by the PDI following accusations of links with 
paramilitary groups. 
The best option for small movements and independent leaders is to form alliances with larger 
parties that allow them to officially launch their candidatures and campaign for local public 
office. In Arauca, the increased number of political movements could well be reduced by the 
high level of local control exercised by the armed and guerrilla forces: “The mayor is 
controlled by the governor and the armed forces”.46  
The composition of municipal councils shows that after the 2003 elections there was indeed a 
more equal distribution of seats between the different parties, and that the new political forces 
forming Uribism won an important level of representation (specifically Cambio Radical and 
Convergencia Ciudadana) (see Tables 6 and 7). The Conservative Party, and left-wing 
movements that had at least one seat in 2000, lost ground in these municipalities in 2003. The 
Liberal Party also lost seats. The transformed council structure is associated with the 
radicalised voting patterns of the 2002 presidential elections, in which officialism triumphed 
in these municipalities. 
Table 6: Council Composition, Arauca (seats per party) 
 
2000 2003 
 Seats  Seats 
Liberal Party 14 Liberal Party 6
Community Political Movement 1 Cambio Radical 3
 Colombia Democrática 2
 Colombia Siempre 1
 Nuevo Partido 1
 Movimiento Convergencia Colombiana 1
 Community Political Movement 1
TOTAL 15 TOTAL 15
                                                
45 CODHES interview, Barrancabermeja, May 2004. 
46 The mayor is part of the Convergencia Ciudadana movement. CODHES interview with Martín Sandoval, 
representative to the Permanent Human Rights Assembly in Arauca, 25 August 2004. 
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Table 7: Council Composition, Barrancabermeja (seats per party) 
 
2000 2003 
 Seats  Seats 
Liberal Party 10 Liberal Party 4
Conservative Party 3 Conservative Party 1
UI 1 Mto Convergencia Ciudadana 5
Independiente Frente de Esperanza 1 Mto Nuevo Liberalismo 2
Mto de Integración Popular 1 Mto Político Comunal y Comunitario 2
Mto Cívico Independiente 1 Mto Ciudadano 1
 C4 1
 Mto Político por la Seguridad Social 1
TOTAL 17 TOTAL 17
 
 
Pasto and Barranquilla experienced different dynamics. These municipalities had been 
consolidating processes prior to the political reform, and left-wing movements had achieved 
an important level of participation in mayoral and council elections (the M-19 in Pasto and 
the Movimiento Ciudadano in Barranquilla). Furthermore, the 2003 elections took place in 
relatively calm conditions, and the majority of those interviewed agreed that they were clean: 
“Yes, the elections were clean, there were no claims of fraud, the day was peaceful, and we 
saw a higher level of participation amongst young people”.47 The interviews also reinforced 
the importance of the opinion vote in the political renovation process: “The mayor was 
elected by opinion vote. The same wasn’t true of the council, where clientelism still 
operates”.48 
Although the dynamics of the armed conflict did not affect the election results in these 
municipalities, there are some aspects that could destabilise public order in the 2006 elections. 
Territorial disputes in Nariño and a growing paramilitary presence in Barranquilla are the 
principal risk factors: 
In the past it was clear that the guerrilla had a strong presence, but now the 
paramilitaries have consolidated their presence on Nariño’s Pacific coast.49  
Certain groups have co-opted businesses, such as the lottery in the Department of 
Bolívar, and they want to do the same in the Department of Atlántico. This person 
is involved with the political class on the coast and has links with 
paramilitarism.50  
  
The election of a PDI mayor in Barranquilla and a Movimiento Convergencia Popular Cívica 
representative in Pasto are a reflection of the continuity of changes to the party system. The 
different social sectors interviewed ratify this tendency, although it does not include the 
public corporations: 
                                                
47 CODHES interview with the mayor of Pasto, Victor Raúl Delgado, August 2004. 
48 CODHES interview with the People’s Defender, Barranquilla, October 2004. 
49 CODHES interview with the People’s Defender, Pasto, August 2004. 
50 CODHES interview with the person from the People’s Defender’s Office in charge of attending the displaced 
population, Barranquilla, October 2004. 
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There has been a partial political renovation in terms of mayors and departmental 
governors, but the old power structures remain in the council and the assembly, 
which has led to alliances between the new sectors and the traditional political 
powers.51  
Over the past decade new political groups have emerged, but they follow old 
practices in terms of corruption. For example, in the previous municipal council 
(2000-2003) there was almost no renovation, just 7 of the 21 councillors were 
from new movements.52 
Thus, the electoral reform is seen as a stimulus for the non-traditional forces that have won 
mayoral elections in these municipalities over the past decade and, furthermore, as having 
allowed these movements to achieve a higher level of representation in municipal councils in 
2003. 
Changes in council composition in Barranquilla (Table 8) do not show a reduced number of 
Liberal Party seats, nor a greater representation of the Movimiento Ciudadano, which 
confirms the fact that reforming the political system has, in this case, been a slow process 
compared to other municipalities. In the words of the Community Action Committee 
president: 
It is a complex situation. Here in Barranquilla the budget is controlled by 
councillors who are nothing more than a bunch of bandits, and the previous 
mayors ended up negotiating with them. This meant that certain sectors were 
favoured. We hope this will change under the current administration.53 
The old way of conducting politics has continued in Barranquilla, where electoral barons 
traditionally create local-level clientelism by using their party’s national-level representation 
as a political resource to win votes and ensure they are elected to municipal office. 
Table 8: Council Composition, Barranquilla (seats per party) 
 
2000 2003 
 Seats  Seats 
Liberal Party 5 Liberal Party 6
Conservative Party 8 Mvto Nacional Progresista 7
Mvto Voluntad Popular 4 Movimiento Ciudadano 2
Mvto Nacional Progresista 1 Partido Verde Oxígeno 1
Mvto Verde Oxígeno 1 Mvto Nueva Fuerza Democrática 1
Mvto Ciudadano 2 Movimiento Nacional 1
 Mvto Conservatismo Independiente 1
 Mvto Apertura Liberal 1
 Mvto Político Voluntad Popular 1
TOTAL 21 TOTAL 21
 
 
In Pasto (see Table 9) the electoral reform’s impact can be observed in the more equal 
distribution of seats amongst new, left-wing political movements, such as the PDI, the Frente 
                                                
51 CODHES interview with a member of the Fundación Foro Costa Atlántica, Barranquilla, October 2004. 
52 CODHES interview with the municipal representative, Barranquilla, October 2004. 
53 CODHES interview with the Communal Action Committee president, Pasto, August 2004. 
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Social y Político, and the Nuevo Partido (each with three seats), and the fact that traditional 
parties lost seats. In these two municipalities, as opposed to Arauca and Barrancabermeja, the 
broadened party system benefited movements who opposed the referendum, and in Pasto 
allowed new opposition movements to win the same number of seats as the traditional parties 
on the municipal council.  
Table 9: Council Composition, Pasto (seats per party) 
 
2000 2003 
 Seats  Seats 
Liberal Party 7 Liberal Party 3
Conservative Party 3 Conservative Party 1
Mvto Alternativa Democrática 3 Nuevo Partido 3
Mvto Convergencia Popular Cívica 1 PDI 3
Mvto Integración Regional 1 Mvto Integración Regional 3
Mvto C4 1 ANAPO 2
Mvto Político Comunal y Comunitario 1 Mvto Frente Social y Político 1
Partido del Socialismo Democrático 1 Moral 1
Proyecto por Pasto 1 C4 1
 Mvto Político por la Seguridad Social 1
TOTAL 19 TOTAL 19
 
The above shows that the political reform’s impact on the party system’s size and 
composition (measured by the NEP) depends to a large degree on the political system’s 
context and structure which, in turn, determines relationships between political leaders at all 
levels (national, regional or departmental, and local or municipal). 
 
Conclusions  
This analysis of the 2003 local elections shows that the closure of political spaces negatively 
affected electoral guarantees. In 20 percent of Colombian municipalities it was impossible to 
vote and be elected. There was a mayoral election with just one candidate, candidates and 
political leaders were threatened, and elections could not be held in eleven municipalities 
where no candidate stood due to the public order situation. Elections in these regions have 
become a strategic scenario for the irregular armed groups, and local democracy is facing 
grave difficulties. 
In spite of the reform’s measures that were designed to reduce the number of candidates (lists 
for council elections and mayoral candidates), there was an increase in 2003. This is 
evidenced not only by the higher effective number of parties, but also by the number of 
mayors representing non-traditional parties. For the first time since mayors have been elected 
by popular vote, relatively new political forces triumphed in more than a third of Colombia’s 
local administrations.  
In contrast, the Liberal Party lost regional representation (just a quarter of municipalities 
elected a Liberal candidate). This was due to the radicalised political climate that favoured the 
emergence of new political forces supporting Uribism. 
In spite of the intensified, expanding armed conflict in some regions, the changes introduced 
by the political reform have led to an increased number of parties (in 2000, the national 
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average number of parties was 2.25; in 2003, it was 3.18). In 2003, more than 60 percent of 
municipalities had near multi-party systems (more than 2.5 parties), compared with 30 percent 
in 2000. Municipal council composition, in the cases examined here, suggests that the 
changes (specifically the participation figure for assigning seats) have generated higher levels 
of representation for new political forces, and local-level political renovation. However, in 
municipalities such as Barranquilla where politics is characterised by clientelism, and 
electoral barons still have a certain degree of influence, political renovation has been slower. 
In addition, the radicalisation of voting in the 2002 presidential elections shifted to the 2003 
local elections following the referendum, and gave them a different set of dynamics. 
Differences between parties and movements were to a certain degree based on supporting or 
opposing Uribism. 
These factors allow us to state that the political reform’s impact on the party system’s size and 
composition (measured by the NEP) depends in a large part on the political context, and the 
political system’s structure per se. In the Colombian case, national party elites’ influence on 
local-level elites and leaders must be highlighted. The significant increase in the effective 
number of parties in more than half of Colombia’s municipalities means that a multi-party 
system is not exclusive to large urban areas, and that the spatial variable, or geographic 
dimension, is a determining factor in electoral-behaviour tendencies.  
We found that in 2003, the non-traditional political movements that won the highest number 
of mayoral and council elections supported Uribism (Movimiento Equipo Colombia – 7.15% 
of mayors; Cambio Radical – 2.75%; and Convergencia Ciudadana – 2.31%). The left-wing 
movements that won mayoral elections in the principal cities (PDI) only won 1.76% of the 
local administrations. This ratifies the hypothesis of voter radicalisation, in which the country 
as a whole moved to the right. 
Although the electoral reform established a threshold for winning seats, and unique lists and 
candidates by party, as mechanisms for stimulating political alliances and promoting 
institutionalisation within the system, this did not happen and there was no reduction in the 
number of lists standing for municipal councils. In contrast, the open list option used by 
almost all parties reflected the importance of personality-based leadership in winning votes. 
In this sense, the municipal council election results showed that the preferential vote 
combined with the threshold formula and unique candidatures by party principally benefited 
political movements rather than candidates. In synthesis, the political reform stimulated 
processes within parties that are oriented towards presenting more structured candidatures and 
processes.  
The political reform encouraged the democratisation of political parties and established 
mechanisms to promote more organised electoral competition, and encourage debate of 
programme content. However, other factors – local political practices and the armed conflict – 
also affect electoral behaviour, the way parties are formed, the regional political map, and 
voter guarantees. In other words, the political regime needs to strengthen its institutions if is 
to guarantee the rule of law in Colombia. This will allow advances to be made in political 
participation processes that democratise access to power, by strengthening means other than 
violence, corruption and clientelism. The regime must strengthen institutionalisation 
processes within the party system and continue supporting transparent politics if it is to 
strengthen democracy via electoral reforms. 
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